The Post

April 30, 2023
4-5 p.m.
350 Bisgrove Hall
Dr. John Keller
Associate Professor
Hogan Endowed Chair of Philosophy
St. Joseph’s University

Coercion seems clearly wrong in a wide variety of cases, including private acts, laws and institutions (coerced labor in “sweat shops”; laws allowing it), and medical judgements (coercing someone to get a medical procedure, even a medical procedure they need). On the other hand, coercion seems clearly permissible in a wide variety of cases: parents permissibly coerce their children with threats of punishment, employers permissibly coerce their employees with threats of termination, and the police permissibly coerce us all with threats of physical violence. Or at least so it seems: perhaps some of these cases don’t involve coercion. Indeed, some have argued that “permissible coercion” is not coercion at all, but something else.

Still, the moral importance of coercion entails that in order to know how to treat each other, we need to know what coercion is and when, if ever, it is permissible. Sadly, this has proven to be quite difficult, and existing accounts of coercion suffer from significant flaws. In this talk I defend a new, social, account of coercion, according to which wrongful coercion is any form of intentional influence or manipulation not justified by the relationship between the coercer and coerce—thus making the existence or wrongness of coercion dependent upon the relationship between the coercer and coercee. It might be objected that this account is unsatisfying without an account of what relationships justify what types of potential coercion (influence or manipulation) and why. But doing that is beyond the scope of this or any talk, paper, or short book: since legitimate political authorities can (plausibly) coerce those under their jurisdictions, giving a “full” account of coercion would involve giving an account of when political authority is legitimate…and since coercion is permitted in various non-political contexts, giving a full account of coercion would require giving a normative ethics as well.